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LIABILITY FOR BREAKING OFF
CONTRACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS?*
ANDREW HUTCHISON†
Senior Lecturer in the Department of Commercial Law, University of Cape Town
In the negotiation phase of a contract opposing parties make representations to each other
in the process of attempting to reach agreement. Assuming there has been wasted
expenditure on one side in anticipation of the contract, can a party recover its losses should
negotiations fail? There is a dearth of South African case law in this area, but foreign
jurisprudence demonstrates the prevalence of this problem. Can benefits conferred on the
other party during negotiations be recouped? Alternatively, does an action lie for reliance
losses? What would be the basis of such claims? And what measure of compensation
would a court award? This article will interrogate issues surrounding the recoverability of
potential enrichment and the possibility of a delictual action for breaking off negotiations if
sufficient progress has been made in those negotiations and there has been reasonable
reliance on a representation by the recalcitrant party.
I INTRODUCTION
The issue at hand is how to compensate a party (‘A’) for pre-contractual
reliance when negotiations are broken off by the opposing party (‘B’). Where
no contract ultimately results between A and B due to B’s conduct, can A
claim damages? This problem is a much discussed one in foreign jurisdic-
tions.1 Consider the following hypothetical example: A is negotiating a
contract with B. Negotiations are expressly subject to contract, but B puts
pressure on A to begin preparations for performance in advance. A is anxious
* This paper benefited from discussions with Professor Dale Hutchison, Professor
Robin Evans-Jones, Professor Helen Scott and Mr Graham Bradfield.
† BA LLB LLM PhD (UCT).
1 A short synopsis of some of the leading texts could be as follows: Generally —
John Cartwright & Martijn Hesselink Pre-Contractual Liability in European Private Law
(2008); USA — E Allan Farnsworth ‘Precontractual liability and preliminary agree-
ments: Fair dealing and failed negotiations’ (1987) 87 Columbia LR 217, Friedrich
Kessler & Edith Fine ‘Culpa in contrahendo, bargaining in good faith, and freedom of
contract: A comparative study’ (1963–1964) 77 Harvard LR 401 (this is a comparative
study focusing on German law and hence providing an element of civilian context);
England — Ewan McKendrick ‘Work done in anticipation of a contract which does
not materialise’ in W R Cornish, Richard Nolan, J O’Sullivan & G Virgo Restitution
— Past Present and Future (1998), Michael Furmston & G J Tolhurst Contract Formation
(2010), Paula Giliker Precontractual Liability in English and French Law (2002), Andrew
Burrows The Law of Restitution 3 ed (2011) 371–80; Scotland — William W McBryde
The Law of Contract in Scotland (2001), Hector L MacQueen & Joe Thomson Contract
Law in Scotland (2000); Australia — J W Carter & M P Furmston ‘Good faith and
fairness in the negotiation of contracts (parts 1 & 2)’ (1994) 8 Journal of Contract Law 1
and (1995) 8 Journal of Contract Law 93; Germany & the Netherlands — Basil
Markesinis, Hannes Unberath & Angus Johnston The German Law of Contract (2006)
92, John M Zieff ‘Culpa in contrahendo — A prescription for the ills of the South
African law of contract’ (1989) 52 THRHR 348, Werner Lorenz ‘Germany’ & Jan M
van Dunné ‘Netherlands’ in Ewoud H Hondius (ed) Precontractual Liability — Reports
to the XIIIth Congress, International Academy of Comparative Law (1990) 159 and 223.
104
JOBNAME: SALJ12 Part1 PAGE: 2 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Fri Mar 9 07:03:50 2012
/dtp22/juta/juta/SALJ−2012−Part1/03article
to get the contract in writing before spending money, but B reassures A that
the contract will definitely go ahead. A spends money in preparation for the
contract. Subsequently negotiations are broken off by B.
Is there any way in which A can recover his losses from B, given that the
expenditure was premised on B’s reassurances? What if B gave those
reassurances with the deliberate intention of keeping A in the picture just to
induce a better offer from C? What if B was merely negligent in making
those representations, since he ought reasonably to have foreseen that he
might not go through with the contract, yet reassured A anyway? In short,
can A recover his reliance expenses from B in delict and to do this would it be
necessary to demonstrate fraud on B’s part, or would negligence suffice?
As a separate question one may inquire what would be the position if A’s
pre-contractual performance had conferred a benefit on B? What if some
structure had been erected on B’s land? Alternatively, what if A’s professional
services in preparing to perform the contract have benefited B? Could the
value of such a benefit be reclaimed with an enrichment action?
In South African law there seems to be little debate about this type of
question. If you have a contract, then there is liability for both parties, but
until then no liability exists. The problem does not appear to be discussed in
enrichment textbooks, perhaps because there is no relevant case law in this
country, and in delict there is only one case where damages for pre-
contractual losses consequent upon a failed contract have been sought. In this
case, Murray v McLean NO,2 the plaintiff was unsuccessful due to a finding
that no liability existed in this context.3 This begs the question whether
South African courts have drawn the line as to liability correctly, particularly
given the fact that overseas courts have viewed the matter differently?4
For present purposes, assume such liability were to be permitted. In which
branch of the law of obligations would such a suit lie? If one analyses this
problem from the frame of reference of the law of contract, some sort of
binding contractual promise would be required to give rise to an action. This
takes the argument into the realm of agreements to agree and the extent to
which these are binding, a question considered in a separate article by the
present author.5 This aspect of the problem will not be reconsidered in this
article; thus the analysis will focus on possible actions outside of the law of
contract.6 In analysing the various interests at stake, it seems appropriate to
2 1970 (1) SA133 (R).
3 See the discussion in part III below.
4 The position in several foreign jurisdictions will be set out below, see by way of
introduction the readings listed in note 1.
5 Andrew Hutchison ‘Agreements to agree: Can there ever be an enforceable
duty to negotiate in good faith?’ (2011) 128 SALJ 273.
6 It is submitted also that the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 is not relevant
to the topic as defined. Section 5(1)(b) of that Act does state that it applies to the
‘promotion of any goods or services’ and ‘promote’ is defined as extending to repre-
sentations that ‘could reasonably be inferred as expressing a willingness to supply any
goods or services for consideration’; however the tenor of the Act as a whole seems to
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invoke the seminal paper of Fuller & Purdue.7 Fuller & Purdue identify
different interests which an award of damages might seek to compensate: the
restitution, reliance and expectation interests.8 Since the contractual aspect of
this problem has been specifically excluded, this paper does not consider
damages measured according to a party’s expectation interest, which would
seek to place a party in the position he would have been in had the contract
been fulfilled. It should be noted at the outset, however, that a contractual
remedy is available in certain jurisdictions, even in the pre-contractual
sphere. The position in some of these jurisdictions will be considered below.
When it comes to demonstrable benefits conferred on the opposing party,
these would fall under the restitution interest and are best claimed with an
enrichment action. This possibility will be discussed in part II. Losses, as a
broader category which may or may not include benefits conferred on the
other party, are compensated as part of the reliance interest. The measure of
this interest is potentially far larger than the restitution interest and its
recovery is more debatable. The reliance interest will be considered in part
III.
II CLAIMING THE RESTITUTION INTEREST
The narrowest claim for compensation consequent on failed negotiations
between party A and party B must rest on any possible enrichment of B at A’s
expense.9 In this section the availability of an enrichment claim to compen-
sate A for benefits conferred upon B will be considered.
According to the South African law of unjustified enrichment, a plaintiff
must identify which of the specific enrichment actions best suits his claim.10
Having identified the appropriate cause of action, of which there is a closed
list originating in the traditional Roman remedies for unjustified enrichment,
a plaintiff must satisfy the requirements of that particular remedy.11 If no
action can be found to fit the circumstances of the plaintiff’s case, either one
of the traditional causes of action must be expanded or there can be no
claim.12 A third possibility is to bring the claim under a so-called ‘general’
enrichment action, but while the availability of this mechanism has been
refer to consumer contracts and marketing to consumers, rather than pre-contractual
negotiations aimed at concluding a contract.
7 L L Fuller & William R Perdue ‘The reliance interest in contract damages
(part 1)’ (1936) 46 Yale LJ 52. For discussion of the same principles in SouthAfrica see:
Gerhard Lubbe ‘The assessment of loss upon cancellation for breach of contract’
(1984) 101 SALJ 616; Dale Hutchison ‘Back to basics: Reliance damages for breach
of contract revisited’ (2004) 121 SALJ 51.
8 Fuller & Purdue op cit note 7 at 53–7.
9 Ibid at 56.
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suggested in the case law to be a future possibility, no such action has yet been
recognised.13
The problem of reclaiming benefits conferred under failed contractual
negotiations needs to be analysed according to the nature of the potential
benefit involved. If the benefit consists of money or property handed over in
ownership by A to B, then this should be able to be recovered using one of
the traditional condictiones. A more problematic issue is how to compensate
for services conferred on party B, absent a contractual basis for those services.
Accordingly in what follows the position with regard to services will be
analysed separately from that relating to property.
With regard to the transfer of property, one must ask on what basis the
transfer was made. If the transfer occurred prior to the conclusion of any sort
of binding contract, which is the position assumed in this paper, then clearly
any analysis based on the failure of a contract is inappropriate. This is not a
situation of breach of contract, supervening impossibility of performance, or
a voidable contract; it is merely a transfer in the expectation that a contract
will eventuate.14 Hence, while the enrichment concerned seems to lie at the
border between enrichment and contract, it does not fit the typical instances
in which the condictiones based on failed contracts would lie. Rather, the
property was transferred in the hope of creating a future obligation. The
appropriate remedy must thus lie outside of reversing contractual transfers
and in the realm of reversing transfers consequent upon a failed (possibly
common) assumption that a contract would eventuate. In other words, the
most appropriate remedy would appear to be the condictio causa data causa
non secuta.15
Immediately at this point an obstacle is struck, however. Lotz & Brand
identify the condictio causa data causa non secuta as lying to recover
expenditure consequent upon a failed modus or performance made under a
contract which has been rendered void due to the failure of a common
assumption which was the basis of a contract to materialise.16 Property given
in anticipation of a contract is not a recognised ground for recovery
(although the similarity of this situation is apparent). Although there is no
specific case law recognising this possibility, there are not many cases in point
and the general description of this condictio seems to suit most eminently the
purpose at hand. Visser describes the condictio causa data causa non secuta as
13 Nortje v Pool NO 1966 (3) SA 96 (A), McCarthy Retail Ltd v Shortdistance Carriers
CC 2001 (3) SA 960 (SCA), Lotz & Brand op cit note 10 para 208, Daniel Visser
Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 46–54.
14 The three instances defined above traditionally demarcate the border between
enrichment and contract. See Visser op cit note 13 at 90–113; Sally Hutton ‘Restitu-
tion after breach of contract: Rethinking the conventional jurisprudence’ 1997 Acta
Juridica 201; Saul Miller ‘Unjustified enrichment and failed contracts’ in Reinhard
Zimmermann, Daniel Visser & Kenneth Reid Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative
Perspective (2004) 437.
15 See Lotz & Brand op cit note 10 paras 217–18; Visser op cit note 13 in ch 8.
16 Lotz & Brand op cit note 10 para 217.
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payment or transfer ‘not in order to fulfil an obligation but to induce a
specific outcome’.17 A common example would be performance under a
void contract in order to obtain a counter-performance which does not
materialise because the contract is unenforceable.18 The analogy between this
common example and the situation where the contract is not void, but fails
to materialise, is strong.
One might argue that perhaps a line has been drawn here on the grounds
of the proper allocation of risks in the pre-contractual bargaining sphere. This
type of risk analysis would perhaps be better suited to services conferred in
anticipation of a contract rather than property conferred, however. Services
might be conferred freely on a party in the hope that a contract might result.
Here the risk may be said to lie with the service provider, since the goal is to
obtain a contract and there is (as of yet) no binding agreement between the
parties. Thus a line needs to be taken here on the proper allocation of the risk
that no contract may result. The service provider should perhaps not be
compensated under the law of unjustified enrichment if there is no clear
evidence of actual benefit to the defendant. A conferral of property falls more
clearly on the other side of the risk line, since such a disposition is less likely
to be considered to be gratuitous. In such a case, the property should be
reclaimable and the most appropriate condictio appears to be the condictio
causa data causa non secuta.19 While Visser’s definition of this condictio cited
above is broad enough to cover both services and property given in
anticipation of a contract, policy considerations may dictate against compen-
sating the service provider, unless he can prove actual enrichment of the
defendant.
What is the appropriate response then to a claim for enrichment by
services? Here the traditional South African action is the action for work
done and services rendered.20 If one analyses work done by party A for the
benefit of party B as the work of an independent contractor, then A should be
entitled to reasonable compensation, either in enrichment or in contract,
provided he can show benefit to B.21 The problem in the present context is
17 Visser op cit note 13 at 455.
18 Ibid at 455, 459–74.
19 Evans-Jones notes that the condictio causa data causa non secuta is the appropri-
ate vehicle for recovery in this context in Scots law. Since the Scots law of enrichment
is based on the traditional Roman law in the same way that South Africa is, this
provides persuasive support for the above argument. See Robin Evans-Jones Unjusti-
fied Enrichment vol I (2003) 199. On the condictio causa data causa non secuta in Scots
law see further: Johann Andreas Dieckmann & Robin Evans-Jones ‘The dark side of
Connelly v. Simpson’ 1995 Juridical Review 90; Robin Evans-Jones ‘The claim to
recover what was transferred for a lawful purpose outwith contract (condictio causa
data causa non secuta)’1997 Acta Juridica 139.
20 Visser op cit note 13 at 552–4; Lotz & Brand op cit note 10 paras 243–44;
Wouter de Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 3 ed (1987) 274–
94.
21 BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391
(A). For discussion of this case see the sources quoted in note 20.
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that the services are rendered in the absence of a contract, hence excluding an
analysis based on compensation for an independent contractor. To argue,
furthermore, that such services constituted negotiorum gestio would be
stretching the definitions of this concept.22 Thus an action for services
rendered in the pre-contractual sphere presents problems to the South
African litigant.23 In English law, however, compensation for services under
the law of restitution has the stamp of approval of the House of Lords.24
Consider the leading English case in this area, Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row
Management Ltd.25 Here the House of Lords was faced with the latest in what
has been a number of cases involving a plaintiff property developer and a
defendant property owner.26 Mr Cobbe, an experienced property developer,
contracted with the defendant company which owned a number of flats. The
terms of the preliminary agreement, which was never formalised into a
binding contract, were that Cobbe would spend money on obtaining
planning permission for a new housing development on the site of an existing
block of flats. If this was successfully obtained, the defendant company would
sell the property to Cobbe for £12 million, on the understanding that should
the profits on the subsequent housing development reach £24 million, it
would be entitled to 50 per cent of the gross profits over this amount. Cobbe
expended considerable amounts of time and energy on this project and was
ultimately successful in obtaining the necessary permission. Of course this
involved a risk by Cobbe, since the money expended in obtaining planning
permission would have been wasted if permission had been denied and in
addition he had no binding contract with the defendant. He proceeded,
however, on the encouragements of the sole director of the defendant
company, Mrs Lisle-Mainwaring. Once planning permission had been
obtained, the defendant refused to sell the property to Cobbe for less than
£20 million, with the defendant to receive 40 per cent of the amount by
which profits exceeded £40 million. Cobbe insisted on sticking to the initial
agreement, however, and the defendant company withdrew from negotia-
tions.
22 For example, Lotz & Brand op cit note 10 paras 222–24.
23 De Vos op cit note 20 deals comprehensively with the position of an indepen-
dent contractor whose services have enriched the defendant. He states (at 283–85)
based on BK Tooling that an action for compensation will lie in contract if the perfor-
mance is accepted and in enrichment if the performance is rejected. De Vos is clear
though (at 287–94) that the defendant must not make use of the rejected performance
if he wishes to escape enrichment liability. Enrichment for services outside of the
context of locatio conductio operis or locatio conductio operarum is not dealt with
by this writer, however.
24 Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 1752.
25 Supra note 24.
26 See further: Way v Latilla [1937] 3 All ER 759, William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd v
Davis [1957] 1 WLR 932, British Steel Corporation v Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Co
Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 504 and Countrywide Communications Ltd v ICL Pathway [2000]
CLC 324. In the similar case of Regalian Properties Ltd v London Docklands Development
Corporation [1995] 1 WLR 212, restitution was denied.
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The House of Lords denied a claim based on proprietary estoppel, which
sought to bind the defendant company to the sale.27 Lord Scott held that this
was impossible since even if the defendant was estopped from denying the
terms of the initial agreement, Cobbe still would not have a contract on
which to base his claim.28 The acquisition of planning rights for the property
had enriched the defendant, however, and this was unjustifiably at the
expense of Cobbe’s services.29 He was awarded a fee appropriate for the
services of an experienced property developer,30 which the House of Lords
described as a quantum meruit.31
There is thus authority for an enrichment action to recover the value
of services rendered in this context in the English law jurisdiction.32 This
position also pertains in Australia. In Sabemo (Pty) Ltd v North Sydney
Municipal Council33 the earlier English case of William Lacey34 was followed,
lending further common law support to this type of action. (In William Lacey,
the leading case prior to Cobbe, the court awarded a quantum meruit to a firm
of builders who had expended time and money in anticipation of a building
contract for which their tender had been accepted.35 The ultimate contract
had not yet been formalised, however, when the defendants broke off
negotiations.) In Sabemo Sheppard J held:
‘[W]here two parties proceed upon the joint assumption that a contract will be
entered into between them, and one does work beneficial for the project, . . .
which he would not be expected, in other circumstances, to do gratuitously, he
will be entitled to compensation or restitution if the other party unilaterally
decides to abandon the project, not for any reason associated with bona fide
disagreement concerning the terms of the contract to be entered into, but for
reasons which, however valid, pertain only to his own position and do not
relate at all to that of the other party.’36
At this point it seems apt to add the very real caution to litigious plaintiffs
that even if it is established that this type of enrichment is unjustified, it is not
always easy to prove the actual enrichment of the defendant. An illustrative
case is Regalian Properties Ltd v London Docklands Development Corporation.37
Here the plaintiff company submitted a tender to develop a tract of land
owned by the defendant. The understanding was that the construction work
would be done as and when vacant possession of the land was obtained. The
27 Cobbe supra note 24 para 28.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid paras 40–1.
30 Ibid paras 41–2.
31 Ibid para 42.
32 See cases listed in note 26.
33 [1977] 2 NSWLR 880. It should be noted that this case was not followed in
Regalian Properties supra note 26 at 227.
34 Supra note 26.
35 Ibid at 940.
36 Supra note 33 at 902–3.
37 Supra note 26.
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plaintiff proceeded on the basis that it would receive the mandate to develop
the land, although negotiations were always expressly subject to the conclu-
sion of an ultimate contract. In the process the plaintiff managed to rack up
expenses totalling almost £3 million, consisting of payments to professional
firms, particularly architects. Obtaining vacant possession proved difficult,
however, and as the months dragged on there was a downward shift in the
property market. Approximately two years after the initial tender had been
accepted the defendant tried to increase the contract price and the plaintiff
decided to abandon the project. The land in question had still not been
developed seven years later at the time of trial. The plaintiff claimed for its
wasted expenditure.
Rattee J in the Chancery Division noted at the outset that there was no
potential contractual action available to Regalian, due to the ‘subject to’
clause.38 When it came to enrichment, however, Rattee J held that the case
before him was distinguishable from the William Lacey case, since the subject
matter of the claim was outside the ambit of the intended contract.39 The
amounts claimed for represented preparatory work for which the defendant
would not have had to pay had a contract ultimately been concluded.40
Indeed there was no evidence to demonstrate that the preparatory work even
benefited the defendant (particularly given the fact that no development
ultimately took place).41 Regalian’s claim for restitution thus failed.42
Of what use is this English and Australian law precedent in our own
jurisdiction? The above series of cases provide a model for refunding a
plaintiff for services rendered in anticipation of a contract where no contract
ultimately results. These cases represent a deliberate stretching of the concept
of enrichment by the English and Australian courts in an attempt to award at
least some relief to plaintiffs who have a suitable case. Arguably this is a
development which owes much to the absence of a potential tortious action
in this field, which has necessitated the development of another arm of the
law of obligations. There does not appear to be any precedent for an
enrichment action along these lines in South Africa, but the possibility of
awarding (at very least) a measure of restitution to a plaintiff should not be
ignored.
The measure of recovery under such an action in South African and
English law needs to be mentioned. The quantum meruit measure favoured
by the House of Lords in Cobbe’s case, has been discussed in South African
law too, although in a different context. The leading Appellate Division case
on quantum meruit recovery in South Africa, BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope
Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk,43 dealt with a claim in the different context
38 Ibid at 221.
39 Ibid at 227.
40 Ibid at 230.
41 Ibid at 229.
42 Ibid at 231.
43 Supra note 21.
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of a claim for specific performance. In a very thorough judgment the
Appellate Division awarded a reduced contract price to the plaintiffs to
remunerate them to the extent that they had successfully rendered perfor-
mance under a breached contract.44 The measure of this reduced contract
price — which the Appellate Division deliberately chose not to term a
quantum meruit — was the original contract price less the cost of remedying
the defects.45
As noted above, however, the very real difference between BK Tooling and
the present context is the fact that in the latter the services are not undertaken
in terms of a contract. It does not follow, however, that the services conferred
on the defendant in the pre-contractual phase will automatically be of no
value to him. Consider the facts of the Cobbe case: there the services of the
professional planner unlocked the potential of real property, greatly enhanc-
ing the value of the land.46 At the same time, however, that potential had
always inhered in the land, hence the award merely of remuneration for
services rendered.47 This type of factual scenario harks back to the South
African case of Nortje v Pool NO.48 There the plaintiff prospector discovered
kaolin on the defendant property owner’s land. The prospector had agreed to
a share of the profits if kaolin was discovered, but the basis of this claim was
removed when the contract between the parties was declared void for want
of necessary formalities. An enrichment claim brought by the prospector
failed on the basis that the value of the land had not been tangibly enhanced
by his services. No claim lay for his expenses and effort.49
Nortje v Pool NO is the case most commentators see as most strongly calling
for intervention in the form of some sort of generalised enrichment liability
in South African law.50 In more recent times, a general enrichment action has
been strongly foreshadowed in the case law, particularly the obiter dictum of
Schutz JA in McCarthy Retail Ltd v Shortdistance Carriers CC.51 Lotz & Brand
state the general requirements for enrichment as being that the defendant
must be enriched; the plaintiff must be impoverished; the defendant’s
enrichment must be at the expense of the plaintiff and the enrichment must
be without legal cause (sine causa).52 If services conferred outside of a
44 Ibid at 439.
45 Ibid at 438–9.
46 Compare the analogy given by Lord Scott at para 41 of Cobbe supra note 24.
47 Ibid.
48 Supra note 10.
49 Ibid at 137–40.
50 For example De Vos op cit note 20 at ch 6; Daniel Visser & Andrew Purchase
‘The general enrichment action cometh’ (2002) 119 SALJ 260 at 264; Robin Evans-
Jones ‘Seeking imposed enrichment in improvements — Classifications and general
enrichment actions in mixed systems: Scotland and SouthAfrica’ (2008) 16 Restitution
LR 18.
51 Supra note 13 paras 8–10. See also Kommissaris v Binnelandse Inkomste v Willers
1994 (3) SA 283 (A) and the opposing authority in Nortje v Pool NO supra note 13.
For an excellent comparative analysis see Visser & Purchase op cit note 50.
52 Lotz & Brand op cit note 10 para 209.
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contractual setting have conferred some sort of benefit on a defendant,
perhaps even just to unlock the potential of his existing property, it is
arguable that a general enrichment action should lie to compensate the
plaintiff. In this manner the defendant could be rewarded for his time and
effort according to the appropriate tariffs for professional services, in a similar
vein to the English approach.
A final comparative note at this point with regard to the English cases
discussed above is to highlight the analysis of Birks, who brings civilian
learning to bear on the body of English case law in this context.53 Birks cites
particularly the William Lacey54 case as an example of enrichment for which
there is an absence of basis (other than the hopes of securing a contract). The
traditional English classification of this class of cases is under ‘failure of
consideration’,55 but Birks’s own analysis does not make use of this
terminology. Birks chooses the language of ‘payment made on the basis of a
liability to be met in the future’, which may or may not materialise.56 Where
the basis ultimately proves absent recovery may lie. Birks cites the condictio
causa data causa non secuta as the Roman equivalent of this action.57 Perhaps
then if South Africa were to follow the approach of Birks, the condictio causa
data causa non secuta could be used in respect of property as well as services,
avoiding the need for a general enrichment action. Admittedly, however, this
would be breaking new ground with regard to the South African use of this
condictio.
The Birksian approach set out above must be read in the context of the
majority of English cases in this field (several of which have been discussed
above). Typically these cases deal with a conferral of services, rather than
property and hence the necessity of adapting the condictio causa data causa
non secuta to this context. It is submitted that when dealing with an
enrichment claim for compensation for services rendered, the plaintiff should
first be tasked with demonstrating the actual enrichment of the plaintiff.
Only if this hurdle can be crossed should an action lie in enrichment — in
which case Birks’s analysis is most apt and is perhaps preferable to creating a
general enrichment action, since it fits within the traditional Roman-Dutch
status quo. If services have resulted in losses for the plaintiff, without
enrichment of the defendant, the plaintiff should then be tasked with
demonstrating reasonable reliance on a representation by the defendant and
be required to establish his action in the law of delict, as will be set out below.
What should be clear from this brief excursus on enrichment is first that
enrichment in the pre-contractual sphere is often very difficult to prove.
Generally it is not property or money which is conferred on the defendant,
which would clearly demonstrate enrichment, but rather something more
53 Peter Birks Unjust Enrichment 2 ed (2005) 142–54.
54 Supra note 26.
55 Compare Burrows op cit note 1 at 371–80.
56 Birks op cit note 53 at 153.
57 Ibid.
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intangible such as services or wasted expenditure, which does not directly
benefit the defendant and for which the use of an enrichment action becomes
more tenuous. Faced with this dilemma a court could stretch the meaning of
the enrichment requirement as in English law to include an action for
services rendered in the pre-contractual sphere, in terms of a generalised
enrichment liability. Alternatively, the condictio causa data causa non secuta
could be put to this purpose as per Birks’s argument set out above.
If the plaintiff can establish reliance, however, and services rendered in
reliance upon the belief that a contract would eventuate have caused him
loss, perhaps an action should lie in delict. As we shall presently see, the
enrichment-based English solution is a response to the lack of an action in
tort for negligently caused pure economic loss. Since South Africa recognises
this form of claim, it would better fit with our existing distinction between
recouping enrichment and recouping other losses for the action for losses to
lie in delict, unless enrichment of the defendant can be clearly demonstrated.
Thus it is to the possibility of an action based on reliance to which this article
now turns.
III CLAIMING THE RELIANCE INTEREST
Continuing to follow the analysis of Fuller & Purdue, the reliance interest
aims to put the plaintiff in as good a position as he was before the promise was
made.58 Following Cockrell, one relies on another when you alter your
position in the belief that the other’s word ‘can be depended upon’.59 As
Cockrell notes, reliance does play a role in South African private law, even in
the law of delict, particularly in areas such as liability for pure economic loss,
where an ongoing relationship between the parties may exist.60 The
increasing role played by reliance in the law is ascribed (inter alia) by Atiyah
to a growing recognition of the importance of community values, which
limit individualism by reference to standards such as ‘reasonableness’, and
which are community based.61 It is this type of argument for social justice
which underpins much of what is to follow.
Transposing Fuller & Purdue to this context, the reliance interest here
must encompass all out-of-pocket losses consequent upon reliance on the
representation that a contract would be concluded.62 This measure should
include wasted expenditure, opportunities forgone and consequential losses
(which are not too remote) and should aim to put the plaintiff (party A) in the
position he would have been in had the representation never been made to
58 Fuller & Purdue op cit note 7 at 54.
59 Alfred Cockrell ‘Reliance and private law’ (1993) 4 Stell LR 41 at 41.
60 Ibid at 49–53.
61 Patrick Atiyah ‘The binding nature of contractual obligations’ in Donald Harris
& Denis Tallon (eds) Contract Law Today (1989) 21 at 28. See also Cockrell op cit note
59 at 56–61.
62 Fuller & Purdue op cit note 7 at 54; Dale Hutchison op cit note 7 at 56.
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him.63 By definition the reliance measure would include the restitution
interest,64 since such benefits conferred upon the defendant also constitute
out-of-pocket losses spent in anticipation of an ultimate contract and hence
augment the global reliance position. If the losses of the plaintiff can be
demonstrated to have been incurred in reliance on a representation of the
defendant that a contract would be concluded, it will not be necessary to
demonstrate a benefit to the defendant in order to establish the alternative
enrichment action and hence prove the plaintiff’s case. This will lighten the
burden of proof and an alternative cause of action — such as delict — would
allow for a fuller measure of damages.
Of course the reliance measure of damages can be claimed following a
breach of contract,65 but since this article presumes that the existence of a
contract cannot be demonstrated, the action must lie in another area of the
law. Two main possibilities present themselves in the comparative literature:
promissory estoppel and delict.66 A third possibility is to extend contractual
liability into the pre-contractual sphere, either by means of an actionable
doctrine of good faith67 or by the German doctrine of culpa in contra-
hendo.68
(a) Promissory estoppel
Promissory estoppel is a doctrine originating in English law, which prevents
the maker of a promise, intended to be legally binding, from denying that he
or she is bound by that promise.69 This mechanism stems back to the decision
of Denning J (as he then was) in Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees
House Ltd,70 where it was developed to provide a defence where no contract
could be relied on due to a lack of consideration given for the promise.71
Promissory estoppel has since then been exported to many common law
countries, including Australia and the USA.72 In South Africa this doctrine
has never taken root for the simple reason that in our law consideration is not
a requirement for a promise to be contractually binding.73 Any serious and
63 Dale Hutchison op cit note 7 at 58; Fuller & Purdue op cit note 7 at 75–80.
64 Compare Dale Hutchison op cit note 7 at 58.
65 See the sources listed in note 7.
66 See particularly the analyses of McKendrick op cit note 1, Carter & Furmston op
cit note 1 & Farnsworth op cit note 1.
67 This is the approach followed in the Netherlands: see Van Dunné op cit note 1
and the discussion in the text below.
68 See the German sources cited in note 1 and the discussion in the text below.
69 Piers Feltham, Daniel Hochberg & Tom Leech Spencer Bower Estoppel by Repre-
sentation (2004) at 441 (paraphrased).
70 [1947] KB 130.
71 Feltham, Hochberg & Leech op cit note 69 at 443–4.
72 Ibid. See especially 513–22. An interesting take on promissory estoppel in the
USA is to be found in Grant Gilmore The Death of Contract (1974). Gilmore felt that
this qualification of the bargain theory of contract would lead to a collapsing of
traditional contract law into tort law.
73 Conradie v Rossouw 1919AD 279.
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deliberate promise freely given with the intention to contract is binding in
South Africa and hence there is no need for promissory estoppel. To give a
fuller comparative account, however, this legal mechanism warrants brief
consideration.
The leading US case, Hoffman v Red Owl Stores,74 heard in Wisconsin in
1965, was decided on the basis of promissory estoppel. Here the plaintiff was
the owner of a bakery at the outset. He entered into negotiations with the
Red Owl chain with the intention of establishing a grocery store under this
franchise in a different town. Hoffman stated that he only had $18 000 to
invest and the Red Owl representative assured him that this would be
sufficient. Thereafter, acting on the advice of Red Owl’s representatives,
Hoffman sold his bakery and bought a small grocery store in a different town
to gain experience in this market. After three months this store was operating
at a profit, but Hoffman was again advised to sell, which he did. He moved
again to the town where the new Red Owl franchise was to be established.
At this point Red Owl moved the goal posts, requiring an increased capital
contribution by Hoffman ($26 000) on terms he could not meet. Negotia-
tions broke down and Hoffman instituted a claim against Red Owl for
damages.
The decision in Hoffman was based on section 90 of the Restatement, First,
Contracts which created a promissory estoppel defence, although not under
that name.75 The Wisconsin Supreme Court endorsed and adopted this rule
in the Hoffman case76 and concluded that injustice would result if the plaintiff
was not awarded some relief based on this principle.77 The plaintiff was
awarded damages to compensate him for his detrimental reliance on Red
Owl’s representations to the extent that he was able to prove an actual loss.78
It has been suggested by some writers that Hoffman was fortunate in the
outcome of his case and that this might not be the typical position of US
law.79 Furthermore, the authors of Spencer Bower on Estoppel point out that
Hoffman v Red Owl Stores would have been decided differently in English law,
since one of the requirements for promissory estoppel in that jurisdiction is a
pre-existing legal relationship between the parties.80 This requirement never
took hold in US law.81 These authors also note many of the principal cases
under section 90 were based on anticipated contracts which did not
74 133 NW 2d 267 (Wisconsin 1965). See in particular Robert E Scott ‘Hoffman v
Red Owl Stores and the myth of precontractual reliance’ (2007) 68 Ohio State LJ 71.
75 See Hoffman supra note 74 at 273. The Restatement, Second, Contracts (1981)
preserves this rule at section 90 with the facts of Hoffman’s case forming the basis of
illustration 10.
76 Hoffman supra note 74 at 274.
77 Ibid at 275.
78 Ibid at 275–7.
79 Scott op cit note 74; Farnsworth op cit note 1 at 237; Furmston & Tolhurst op
cit note 1 at 390.
80 Feltham, Hochberg & Leech op cit note 69 at 516.
81 Ibid.
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materialise, which has not been the case in the English law of promissory
estoppel.82 Another difference between promissory estoppel in the UK and
that found in the US and Australia is that the English rule which holds that
estoppel is a shield and not a sword is not enforced in these latter
jurisdictions.83 Hence promissory estoppel may serve as a self-standing cause
of action in certain jurisdictions, as was famously held in the landmark
Australian case of Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher.84 This step represents a
considerable watering down of the consideration requirement in these legal
systems. Rather than promissory estoppel providing a defence to a claim
based on other grounds, this makes a mere promise, unsupported by
consideration, actionable. This undermines the bargain theory of contract
and represents a step in the direction of countries (like South Africa) which
have no consideration requirement.
In conclusion on this topic, it should by now be apparent that reliance
expenditure on failed negotiations may be recovered in Australia or the USA
by means of a form of promissory estoppel. This action has little relevance in
South Africa, however, since a promise given in this country is enforceable
and hence a plaintiff in this type of scenario would be thrust into the realm of
contract law, or at the least, agreements to agree, which are beyond the scope
of this paper.
(b) Culpa in contrahendo
In Germany a negotiating party can rely on the doctrine of culpa in
contrahendo, which is neither precisely delictual nor contractual, but rather a
hybrid of the two actions.85 The father of this approach is recognised to be
Von Jhering, who published an essay on this topic in 1861.86 Markesinis et al
state that while the freedom not to contract is recognised, in very exceptional
circumstances the law indeed imposes an obligation to contract and a party
who nevertheless breaks off negotiations under these circumstances will be
liable in damages to the opposing party, provided fault is present.87 Thus
82 Ibid. Hence no doubt the fact that English courts tend to focus on the restitution
interest as set out above in part II. For an argument that the English law of promissory
estoppel should be available to plaintiffs as a cause of action see Ben McFarlane ‘The
protection of pre-contractual reliance: A way forward?’ (2010) 10 Oxford University
Commonwealth LJ 95; Giliker op cit note 1 at ch 5.
83 USA: Hoffman v Red Owl Stores supra note 74, Carter & Furmston op cit note 1
at 103. Australia: Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387; McKen-
drick op cit note 1 at 188 – 189; Burrows op cit note 1 at 379–80; Michael Spence
‘Australian estoppel and the protection of reliance’ (1997) 11 Journal of Contract Law
203 at 211.
84 Supra note 83.
85 See generally sources on German law mentioned in note 1.
86 Rudolf von Jhering ‘Culpa in contrahendo oder Schadensersatz bei nichtigen
oder nicht zur Perfection gelangten Verträgen’ (1861) cited in Lorenz op cit note 1 at
161.
87 Markesinis, Unberath & Johnston op cit note 1 at 100. See also Lorenz op cit
note 1 at 165.
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‘special care’ is required of parties conducting negotiations.88 These authors
add with reference to case law that a party may be liable for the reliance
expenditure of his or her counterpart if that party breaks off negotiations or
withholds final acceptance after the conclusion of a final contract seemed
certain.89
(c) Good faith
In the Netherlands there is case authority from the Hoge Raad that reliance
damages can be awarded for breach of a duty of good faith in one’s dealings
with an opposing party to negotiations.90 If one is obliged to negotiate in
good faith, this seems to extend contractual liability into the pre-contractual
sphere, rather like the German position. Indeed the debt to Von Jhering for
the origins of the modern Dutch approach is recognised by scholars such as
Van Dunné.91 This author states that prior to the Plas v Valburg92 case in 1982,
however, the predominant view was that pre-contractual liability lay within
the sphere of delict.93 Van Dunné states that the issue as to under which
branch of law the action lies is largely academic, since the focus in modern
Dutch law is on remedies rather than specific (‘dogmatic’) causes of action.94
Good faith nevertheless stands as an independent ground of action in Dutch
law and is used in this context to recover losses consequent upon failed
contractual negotiations.95
The Plas v Valburg case represents a landmark in the area of pre-contractual
reliance and identifies the Netherlands as having the most liberal rules in this
context in Europe.96 There the Hoge Raad made a very useful distinction
between three stages in contracting. First there is an initial stage where parties
are free to break off negotiations. Secondly, there is a continuing stage when
a party may break off negotiations, but must compensate the reliance
expenditure of his or her counterpart. Thirdly, there is the final stage; here
breaking off negotiations would be contrary to good faith and may ground a
claim for reliance damages and even, in exceptional circumstances, expecta-
88 Markesinis, Unberath & Johnston op cit note 1 at 100; Lorenz op cit note 1 at
165.
89 Markesinis, Unberath & Johnston op cit note 1 at 100. The cases cited are BGH
WM 1969, 595; NJW 1975, 1774, case no 29; and NJW-RR 1989, 627.
90 Van Dunné op cit note 1 at 227 cites the case of Plas v Municipality of Valburg 18
June 1982, NJ 1983, 723 as the source of this rule. See also Arthur S Hartkamp
‘Judicial discretion under the New Civil Code of the Netherlands’ (1992) 40 American
Journal of Comparative Law 551 at 557.
91 Van Dunné op cit note 1 at 225.
92 Supra note 90.
93 Van Dunné op cit note 1 at 227.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid. See Plas v Valburg supra note 90.
96 John Cartwright & Martijn Hesselink ‘Conclusions’ in Cartwright & Hesselink
op cit note 1 at 468–70.
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tion damages.97 The stage reached in negotiations will depend on the facts
and reasonable assumptions of both parties in the circumstances.98
The Plas v Valburg analysis provides a useful tool in determining the
availability of damages in this context. Even if awarding the expectation
interest were to be regarded as going a step too far, it is useful to consider the
circumstances of the parties and their reasonable assumptions based on those
circumstances, particularly with regard to the progress of negotiations, in
determining whether (at least reliance) losses should be recoverable.
In Scotland, a narrow form of pre-contractual liability, referred to as
‘Melville Monument’ liability, exists. The name is based on the subject
matter of the case where it was first established, Walker v Milne.99 The
modern status of this doctrine was neatly encapsulated in the leading case of
Dawson International plc v Coats Patons plc.100 Here Lord Cullen held in the
Outer House that this type of liability was available to a plaintiff who had
relied on the implied assurance by the defendant that there was a binding
contract between them, when in fact there was a mere agreement which fell
short of being a binding contract.101 This type of claim was held to be an
equitable one and was not based in contract, delict or enrichment.102 Good
faith in the Scottish law of contract has been given a fresh impetus by the
House of Lords decision in Smith v Bank of Scotland.103 There it was held that
there was a duty on a bank to disclose potential difficulties to a would-be
surety (cautioner) before concluding a contract of suretyship.104 The basis of
this duty in Scots law was held to be good faith.105
In a discussion of good faith in the context of pre-contractual liability,
MacQueen argues that good faith should be used as a basis for the
development of new rules to deal with the problems of this area. He does,
however, note that at present the existing tools of Melville Monument
liability and the law on misrepresentation provide only a very narrowly
circumscribed response to this problem.106 As can be seen from the limits set
on Melville Monument liability by Lord Cullen, this mechanism hardly
presents a generalised solution to the problem of pre-contractual reliance.
This may well be ascribed to the lack of a well-developed principle of good
97 Van Dunné op cit note 1 at 230.
98 Ibid.
99 (1823) 2 S 379. See further McBryde op cit note 1 at 5.60–5.70; MacQueen &
Thomson op cit note 1 at 2.91–2.96; Hector L MacQueen ‘Good faith in the Scots
law of contract: An undisclosed principle?’ in A D M Forte (ed) Good Faith in Contract
and Property (1999) 5 at 22–37; Martin Hogg & Hector MacQueen ‘Notes on the
Scottish jurisdiction’ in Cartwright & Hesselink op cit note 1.
100 1988 SLT 854.
101 Ibid at 866.
102 Ibid at 865.
103 1997 SC (HL) 111. See Fritz Brand & Douglas Brodie ‘Good faith in contract
law’ in Zimmermann, Visser & Reid (eds) op cit note 14 at 94.
104 Smith supra note 103 at 120–1.
105 Ibid.
106 MacQueen op cit note 99 at 33–7.
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faith and perhaps in time the law in this area will develop along the lines
suggested by MacQueen under the influence of the Smith decision. Any
development is likely to proceed gradually, however, because, as Brand &
Brodie note, a narrower (and in their view preferable) interpretation of Smith
is that it represents a modification of the law in the area of suretyship, rather
than a ‘new fundamental principle’.107 This view underlies their conclusion
that Scottish law continues not to recognise an independent principle of
good faith.108 Be that as it may, Melville Monument liability is still one step
closer to recognising a form of pre-contractual liability than the present
South African position.
(d) Delict
What the aforegoing discussion should illustrate is that the choice of remedy
which a legal system offers for the recovery of pre-contractual reliance will
depend on the intricacies of that system. South African law is different from
most civil law jurisdictions in that we do not recognise a duty of good faith in
contractual negotiation which is actionable independent of supervening legal
doctrines,109 and is different from most common law systems in that we do
not recognise the doctrine of consideration.110 Thus a solution to this
problem that is suitable for our own legal system needs to be found. The
remainder of this section will consider the solutions which have been
proffered on the basis of delict and then will attempt to formulate an action
for reliance-based damages suitable to our own climate.
Since the major focus so far has been on English law, the question will
need to be answered why English law chooses enrichment as the basis for
decisions dealing with pre-contractual reliance, given the inherent limita-
tions of this branch of the law of obligations. Perhaps the discussion should
begin with often quoted denial by the House of Lords of any duty to
negotiate in good faith in English contract law:
‘[T]he concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently
repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when involved in negotia-
tions. Each party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her) own
interest, so long as he avoids making misrepresentations. To advance that
107 Brand & Brodie op cit note 103 at 103.
108 Ibid at 116. The similarities of this approach and that favoured by the South
African Supreme Court of Appeal in Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) are men-
tioned by the authors. Whether this statement is still true of SouthAfrican law follow-
ing Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA323 (CC) is open to interpretation, however.
109 See particularly Brisley v Drotsky supra note 108; Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom
2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA); Barkhuizen v Napier supra note 108; Reinhard Zimmermann
‘Good faith and equity’ in Reinhard Zimmermann & Daniel Visser (eds) Southern
Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 217; Dale Hutchison ‘Good
faith in the South African law of contract’ in Roger Brownsword, Norma J Hird &
Geraint Howells (eds) Good Faith in Contract: Concept and Context (1999) 213.
110 Conradie v Rossouw supra note 73; R H Christie The Law of Contract in South
Africa (2006) 10; Schalk van der Merwe, LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke & GF
Lubbe Contract — General Principles (2007) 195–6.
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interest he must be entitled, if he thinks it appropriate, to threaten to withdraw
from further negotiations or to withdraw in fact, in the hope that the opposite
party may seek to reopen the negotiations by offering him improved terms.’111
This negates, as in South African law, any potential pre-contractual
liability based on good faith. The possibility of redress following a misrepre-
sentation is mentioned in the above quote. This introduces the possibility of
an action based in tort. It is trite law that fraud will not be tolerated, even in a
pre-contractual setting, and to this end the tort of deceit is available for
redress in situations where fraud by one party is clearly demonstrable.112 This
action necessitates that a plaintiff show deliberate intention to deceive, or at
the very least recklessness as to whether a representation was true or not, on
the part of the defendant.113 This is a difficult evidentiary burden to meet,
making the tort of negligence far more attractive to a potential litigant.
The English courts are reluctant, however, to recognise liability in tort for
negligently caused pure economic loss.114 This was the starting point in
English law, based it would seem on a floodgates type of argument.115 Then,
in 1964, a landmark judgment of the House of Lords recognised an action for
pure economic loss caused by a negligent misstatement. Following this
decision in Hedley Byrne & Co v Heller & Partners Ltd,116 there followed a brief
period of expansion with decisions like Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon117 and
Anns v Merton Burrough Council,118 which reached a high point in Junior Books
Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd.119 In Junior Books the plaintiff factory owner employed a
builder to build a new factory. A sub-contractor was employed to do the
flooring, but the floors turned out to be defective and needed to be replaced.
Instead of suing the main building contractor, the plaintiff sued the
sub-contractor, with whom it had no contractual nexus. The House of Lords
found for the plaintiff.
In Murphy v Brentwood District Council,120 however, the House of Lords
overruled the Anns case, putting a halt to Junior Books type of actions which
sought to circumvent contractual privity via tort. The tendency not to allow
claims for negligently caused economic loss continued in the subsequent
111 Walford v Miles [1992] 2AC 128 at 138.
112 Giliker op cit note 1 at 106.
113 Ibid.
114 See generally Dale Hutchison ‘Murphy’s law: The recovery of pure economic
loss in the tort of negligence’ (1995) 6 Stell LR 3; Giliker op cit note 1 at ch 4; David
Howarth ‘Economic loss in England: The search for coherence’ in Efstathios K Bana-
kas (ed) Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss (1996) 27; A M Dugdale ‘Negligence’ in
Anthony M Dugdale & MichaelA Jones Clerk & Lindsell on Torts 19 ed (2006).
115 Dugdale op cit note 113 at 443, Giliker op cit note 1 at 107–9.
116 [1964]AC 465.
117 [1976] QB 801.
118 [1978] 1AC 728.
119 [1983] 1AC 520. See Giliker op cit note 1 at 109.
120 [1991] 1AC 398.
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decisions of the House of Lords.121 The Hedley Byrne principle remains part
of English law, however, as it was too entrenched to overrule.122 In Hedley
Byrne the plaintiff company was an advertising agency, which placed
advertisements for clients on terms whereby the agency would be liable
should the client default. In order to protect themselves the advertisers
sought a reference from the client’s bankers. This was returned with positive
feedback, but the client went insolvent soon afterwards. The advertisers
successfully sued the bankers for losses suffered in consequence of their
negligent representation. The House of Lords was careful in that case to
emphasise the need for a special relationship between the parties in order for
an action to lie and the need for the loss to be foreseeable.123 The
requirement of reasonable reliance was also stressed by certain of the
Lords.124 The extent to which a special relationship exists is largely deter-
mined by how close the parties are to a relationship akin to contract.125
Howarth argues with reference to the subsequent case law that there is a
strong presumption against expanding the categories in which damages for
negligently caused pure economic loss are recoverable.126 Thus extending
the action for economic loss to pre-contractual negotiations would be
difficult.127 McKendrick has argued that no duty of care exists under these
circumstances.128 This conclusion seems to be supported by Giliker129 and by
the absence of a body of contrary case law.
The lack of an action for negligently caused pure economic loss extends
also to American law.130 This would seem to explain why tort is also not the
avenue of redress chosen in that country, with the focus being on estoppel
under section 90 of the Restatement, Second, Contracts.131 Common law
countries thus provide little assistance with their laws of tort. When one
looks to the French law of delict, however, clear authority exists for an action
for pre-contractual reliance. The basic starting point is articles 1382 and 1383
121 Spring v Guardian Assurance Plc [1995] 2AC 296; Henderson v Merret Syndicates Ltd
[1995] 2AC 145; White v Jones [1995] 2AC 207.
122 Giliker op cit note 1 at 109.
123 Hedley Byrne supra note 116 at 502, 528, 534. See Giliker op cit note 1 at 109.
124 Hedley Byrne supra note 116 at 480. See Hutchison op cit note 114 at 29; Cock-
rell op cit note 59 at 50.
125 Dugdale op cit note 114 at 449. See further Commissioners of Customs and Excise v
Barclays Bank Plc [2004] EWCACiv 1555.
126 Howarth op cit note 114 at 32.
127 Giliker op cit note 1 cites (at 110–11) the High Court decision in Box v Midland
Bank [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 391 as the only example of an English case where this has
been done. In Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon supra note 117 damages were awarded
for a negligent misrepresentation inducing a contract, although this is slightly differ-
ent from the present context, since a contract was actually concluded in that case.
128 McKendrick op cit note 1 at 190.
129 Giliker op cit note 1 at 118–19.
130 Gary T Schwartz ‘The economic loss doctrine in American tort law: Assessing
the recent experience’ in Efstathios K Banakas (ed) op cit note 114 at 103, Dan B
Dobbs The Law of Torts (2000) § 452.
131 See above on promissory estoppel.
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of the French Civil Code.132 Article 1382 reads as follows: ‘Any act whatever
of man which causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it
occurred to make reparation.’133 Article 1383 reads: ‘Each one is liable for the
damage which he causes not only by his own act but also by his negligence or
imprudence.’134
These two articles contain the essence of the French law of delict, which is
clearly based on a broad principle of liability, which recognises all losses
caused deliberately or negligently.135 It should be apparent from the text of
the articles quoted above that there is no express wrongfulness element in the
French law of delict. Giliker notes that French courts have no problem in
awarding damages for pure economic loss.136 Her analysis of the leading
French cases reveals that whether or not reliance damages are available
depends on the circumstances of a particular case.137 Courts will look
particularly at the stage of negotiations which the parties have reached, the
presence or absence of bad faith or negligence and the suddenness with
which negotiations are broken off.138 Deshayes & Maitre give the following
typical examples of bad faith: entering negotiations with no real intention to
contract; wrongful behaviour by one of the parties, such as disclosing
confidential information furnished to him or her and finally, breaking off
negotiations suddenly when the other party had good reason to believe a
contract would be concluded.139 The action is for reliance damages, never
expectation damages or specific performance.140
French law thus seems to protect the legitimate expectations of a
contracting party, even in the pre-contractual sphere.141 Once negotiations
have reached a particular point (which will have to be assessed on the facts) it
becomes possible to impose liability on a party who breaks off dealings,
provided fault is present.
As a final comparative indicator to set the scene for a discussion of the
South African law of delict in this context, it should be noted that the Court
of Justice of the European Communities chose to frame an action based on
132 For an account of the French law in this context see Giliker op cit note 1 and the
notes on French law prepared by Olivier Deshayes & Gregory Maitre in Cartwright
& Hesselink (eds) op cit note 1.
133 Translation taken from John H Crabb The French Civil Code (1995) at 252.
134 Ibid.
135 Compare Giliker op cit note 1 at 120.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid at 123.
138 Giliker cites Cass com 20.3.1972 JCP 1973 II 17543 note J Schmidt (Cour de
cassation) & Riom 10.6.1992 RJDA 1992 No 893 (Court of Appeal of Riom) as the
leading authority for this description of the law.
139 Deshayes & Maitre op cit note 132 at 29.
140 Ibid at 31 (paraphrased).
141 Compare the conclusion of Giliker op cit note 1 at 132.
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pre-contractual reliance as a tort/delict in the fairly recent Tacconi case.142
This conclusion was reached after surveying the laws of several leading
European jurisdictions as well as art 2.1.15 of the Unidroit Principles of
International Commercial Contracts.143 The question arose in the context of
jurisdictional dispute between two international parties, a German company
and an Italian company. If the pre-contractual wrong complained of was held
to be actionable in contract, the courts of the country of performance would
have jurisdiction under the relevant Brussels Convention. If the wrong was
actionable in delict, the place where the harmful event occurred would hear
the matter. The Advocate General proposed a pre-contractual regime not
dissimilar to that of the Netherlands, with legitimate expectations of the
relying party being protected differently depending on how far negotiations
had progressed.144 The court held since no obligation had been freely
assumed by the defendant toward the plaintiff (in the absence of a binding
contract) the action must lie in delict.145
What should be clear by now is that there is some support internationally
for the idea of an action for reliance damages based in delict. In South African
law the action for pure economic loss is well established.146 Fraud in the
pre-contractual phase is actionable, even if a contract does not ultimately
materialise.147 Negligence is a more difficult issue. A negligent misrepresen-
tation is actionable if a contract results from negotiations,148 but what if no
contract comes into being? For pre-contractual loss caused negligently to be
actionable in this context, it would be necessary to extend liability for
negligent misrepresentation to recognise that such a representation is also
actionable where it forms the basis of pre-contractual reliance where the
142 Fonderie Officine Meccaniche Tacconi Spa v Heinrich Wagner Sinto Maschinenfabrik
GmbH in para 27 of the judgment. This case is available at www.unilex.info, last
accessed on 7 February 2011.
143 Article 2.1.15 ‘Negotiations in bad faith’ reads as follows:
‘(1) A party is free to negotiate and is not liable for failure to reach an
agreement.
(2) However, a party who negotiates or breaks off negotiations in bad faith is
liable for the losses caused to the other party.
(3) It is bad faith, in particular, for a party to enter into or continue
negotiations when intending not to reach an agreement with the other
party.’
144 Tacconi supra note 142 paras 55–66 of the opinion of theAdvocate General.
145 iIbid paras 19–27 of the judgment of the court.
146 Hefer v Van Greuning 1979 (4) SA 952 (A); Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas
Bank Ltd 1992 (1) SA 783 (A); Trustees, Two Oceans Aquarium Trust v Kantey & Templer
(Pty) Ltd 2006 (3) SA 138 (SCA); J Neethling, J M Potgieter & J C Knobel Law of
Delict (2010) at 10 and 290; Max Loubser & Rob Midgley (eds) The Law of Delict in
South Africa (2009) 224–9.
147 Meskin NO v Anglo American Corporation of SA Ltd 1968 (4) SA 793 (W) at
802–4.
148 Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 (3) SA824 (A); Bayer South
Africa (Pty) Ltd v Frost 1991 (4) SA559 (A).
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anticipated contract fails to materialise. In other words, the finding in Murray
v McLean NO149 needs to be reconsidered.
Murray v McLean NO is a case which was reported in 1970 from what was
then Rhodesia. There the plaintiff case argued that a representative of the
Rhodesian Minister of Health had represented to him that 52 prefabricated
houses were required by the ministry and that funds were available to
purchase such houses. (Murray carried on business as a manufacturer of
prefabricated houses.) The representative also informed Murray that sites had
been prepared for these houses and that these were awaited by the ministry.
The representative knew the cost of the housing and that Murray’s business
was expending time and materials preparing these houses. He also knew that
funds were not guaranteed. Ultimately funds were not forthcoming from the
ministry and no contract eventuated. Murray brought a delictual action to
recover his reliance expenditure. The Rhodesian court held that the claim
was not actionable in the law of delict of Rhodesia or South Africa.150 The
essence of Lewis J’s objection to the plaintiff’s case appears to be that he
viewed the plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s representations as unreason-
able.151 This view in turn seems to rely on the position which prevailed in
South African law at the time that negligently caused pure economic loss was
not actionable.152 Lewis J was strengthened in his finding by the opinion that
the fact that the defendant was a representative of the Rhodesian government
and hence his undertaking was subject to considerations of what was in the
public interest.153
In present day law, a discussion on extending delictual liability into the
pre-contractual sphere to recover losses consequent upon a failed contract
should begin with the trite observation that in order for such an action to
succeed in South Africa all elements thereof need to be proved. Thus there
149 1970 (1) SA 133 (R). For discussion of this case see P Q R Boberg 1970 Annual
Survey of South African Law 159–60; W H B Dean ‘Put not your trust in princes, nor in
the son of man, in whom there is no help — Psalm 146, Verse 3’ (1970) 87 SALJ 149;
Hutchison in Brownsword, Hird & Howells (eds) op cit note 109 at 236–42.
150 Murray supra note 149 at 138H–140G.
151 Ibid.
152 Lewis J cited the South African cases of Herschel v Mrupe 1954 (3) SA 464 (A) and
Hamman v Moolman 1968 (4) SA340 (A) in support of this view.
153 Ibid at 140F–142A. Since the defendant in this case was the state, one might
today argue (if this were a South African case) that Murray had a legitimate expecta-
tion of concluding the contract. A legitimate expectation, as distinct from a right, is
protected in SouthAfrican administrative law to the extent that where such an expec-
tation exists, the affected party has a right to a hearing before a decision regarding his
or her position is taken. See Administrator, Transvaal v Traub 1989 (4) SA 731 (A); Cora
Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) 376–92. Whether the protection of
legitimate expectations extends to substantive relief is debatable, however. See Hoex-
ter op cit; Geo Quinot ‘The developing doctrine of substantive protection of legiti-
mate expectations in South African administrative law’ (2004) 19 SA Public Law 543.
What this means for cases like Murray’s is that while the plaintiff may have a right to a
hearing if he can show he had a legitimate expectation of contracting, it is unlikely a
court would force the government to contract on this basis.
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must be conduct, harm, fault on the part of the defendant, the wrongfulness
of the conduct must be recognised by South African law and the conduct
must be the factual and legal cause of the harm complained of.154 The harm
suffered will be the losses of the plaintiff expended in reliance on the
contract. The conduct is a bit trickier — is it the act of breaking off
negotiations or the actual representation on which the plaintiff relied? It may
be that both aspects need to be considered, since while the breaking off of
negotiations might be the most obvious cause of the harm, it is the
representation that a contract would eventuate which caused the reliance by
the plaintiff. It will be assumed here that the conduct complained of caused
the reliance damages claimed and that these are not too remote.155 This
leaves the troublesome issues of wrongfulness and fault to consider.
In the recent decision of Trustees, Two Oceans Aquarium v Kantey & Templer
(Pty) Ltd,156 a unanimous Supreme Court of Appeal held that what was
meant by wrongfulness in the context of pure economic loss was whether
‘public or legal considerations require that such conduct, if negligent, is
actionable’.157 The question is thus not so much about whether fault is
present, but whether liability should be imposed for that kind of culpable
conduct. This limits the floodgates potential of liability for pure economic
loss. In the context of pre-contractual reliance fault is easier to establish than
wrongfulness. If the conduct complained of is the breaking off of negotia-
tions, then this will almost certainly have been done intentionally. Indeed a
key element of hard bargaining is the ability to break off negotiations — or to
threaten to do so — and according to principles of freedom of contract a
party is entitled to do this. Thus establishing fault here is easy: the question is
whether this conduct is wrongful.
What about the making of representations prior to breaking off
negotiations? It is this conduct which has probably caused the reliance of the
plaintiff. A deliberate intention to induce pre-contractual reliance by a
defendant without intending to ultimately conclude a contract158 would
probably constitute fraud in the pre-contractual sphere. In support of this
view one could quote the dictum of Jansen J (as he then was) in Meskin NO v
Anglo American Corporation of SA Ltd159 that bad faith conduct constituted a
fraud, which extended even into the pre-contractual stage of a contract.160
154 Compare (for example) Loubser & Midgley op cit note 146 at 21–2.
155 Causation could, however, be an important means of controlling liability in this
type of action, such as where the contract does not materialise due a reason unrelated
to the representation or conduct of the defendant. Compare Dean op cit note 149 at
155. Giliker op cit note 1 argues (at 106) the contrary position that in practice causa-
tion of loss is generally not an issue.
156 Supra note 146.
157 Ibid at para 12.
158 Compare Unidroit PICC art 2.1.15(3) reproduced above at note 143.
159 Supra note 147.
160 Ibid at 802–4. Compare the statement in Savage and Lovemore Mining (Pty) Ltd v
International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd 1987 (2) SA149 (W) at 198A–B.
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This finding was based on the notion that good faith in negotiating a contract
may require disclosure of facts known to one party where there is involuntary
reliance by the other.161 Non-disclosure would then constitute bad faith
conduct. Jansen J’s argument was that based on the similarity between the
‘legal convictions of the community’ test used in establishing wrongfulness in
delict and the requirement of good faith in negotiating a contract, bad faith
could be said to constitute fraud.162 Jansen J added that a delictual action was
available in respect of this type of conduct.163
In Meskin’s case bad faith in contrahendo was alleged, in the form of a
non-disclosure. Here the plaintiff was the liquidator of a company called
Titanium, which held shares in a second company, Umgababa, which was
controlled by the defendant, Anglo American. Unbeknown to Titanium,
Umgababa had entered into a losing contract, which would eventually lead
to its downfall. Nevertheless Titanium was offered 50 000 shares in
Umgababa subsequent to the conclusion of this losing contract. Anglo
American at this point offered to buy the entire share-holding of Titanium,
which given the inside knowledge of the defendant, induced a belief in
Titanium that its shares in Umgababa were valuable. Titanium then sub-
scribed for the further shares on offer. Soon after, Umgababa was placed in
liquidation and Titanium ultimately went the same way. Meskin, the
liquidator of Titanium, then sued Anglo American for inducing the further
subscription of shares. The measure of damages alleged was the price offered
by Anglo American for the full shareholding of Titanium, prior to the
subscription in question. The defendant successfully excepted that the facts
alleged disclosed no cause of action.
Jansen J held that the action alleged relied on a finding that there had been
bad faith on the part of the defendant and the appropriate vehicle for such an
action was not contract, but delict.164 He found, however, that there was no
fiduciary duty owed by the defendant to Titanium and hence Anglo
American’s exception should succeed.165 The dictum of Jansen J that
pre-contractual fraud is actionable thus provides authority for the argument
advanced here that reliance damages should be claimable where a fraudulent
misrepresentation has been made in the pre-contractual sphere.
The wrongfulness question becomes more difficult, however, when one
considers the possibility of extending this type of action to negligently caused
losses. As noted above, negligent misstatements and negligent misrepresenta-
tions which ultimately cause a contract are actionable. The action for
recovery is delictual and the reliance measure of damages is claimed.166 Does
it make a difference if no contract ultimately results? The argument advanced
161 Ibid at 804.
162 Ibid.
163 Meskin supra note 147 at 798F.
164 Ibid at 807.
165 Ibid.
166 See cases cited in note 148.
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here is that the conduct complained of consists in failing to contract after
making a representation that one would, in circumstances where the
plaintiff’s reliance on the representation was reasonable. In effect this is a type
of prior conduct followed by an omission, however the wrongfulness must
be judged with reference to the representation made, since it is herein that
the fault lies.
The facts of Murray’s case are in point. Should Murray have had an action?
The line this article will adopt is that Murray should have had an action.
While the representations of the government official in Murray did not
necessarily constitute bad faith negotiation, this official negligently failed to
ensure that his representations were accurate in his negotiations with the
plaintiff.167
In Murray v McLean NO Lewis J held that on the facts the plaintiff had not
made out his cause of action.168 This finding was based largely on the South
African cases of Herschel v Mrupe169 and Hamman v Moolman.170 Both cases
involved negligent representations and demonstrated the reluctance of the
Appellate Division to grant an action for pure economic loss in this area.171
Following the decision in Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika172 that
a negligent misrepresentation causing economic loss was actionable, the
Herschel and Hamman precedents have been overtaken by subsequent legal
developments.173 Much attention was also focused by Lewis J on the English
case of Hedley Byrne,174 which established liability for negligent misstatement
in that jurisdiction, but concluded that the circumstances of that case were
different to Murray’s.
A further aspect of the judgment of Lewis J which bears attention was the
statement, made with reference to the dictum of Van den Heever JA in
Herschel’s case that the plaintiff in a case of this type should use ‘ordinary care
and prudence in avoiding injury to himself’.175 Lewis J explained by the
analogy of a woman trying on shoes in a shoe store, who causes the
shopkeeper to miss out on other potential sales because of the devotion of his
attention to her, only to have her announce at the last moment that she had
167 The concept of a ‘duty to negotiate with care’ is borrowed from Hugh Collins
The Law of Contract 4 ed (2003) 216–20, who advocates such a duty which is neither
precisely tortious nor contractual, so that English courts could develop the possibili-
ties of awarding damages in this context. For a Canadian argument in favour of
recognising an action in tort for this purpose see Geoffrey F Cauchi ‘The protection
of the reliance interest and anticipated contracts which fail to materialize’ (1981) 19
University of Western Ontario LR 237.
168 Murray supra note 149 at 142.
169 Supra note 152.
170 Supra note 152.
171 Compare Dean op cit note 149 and Dale Hutchison ‘Aquilian liability II (Twen-
tieth century)’ in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) op cit note 109 at 619, 629.
172 Supra note 148.
173 Bayer supra note 148 at 569H.
174 Supra note 116.
175 Murray supra note 149 at 136.
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just realised that she had no money.176 The shopkeeper has no action against
her for opportunities foregone, argues the learned judge.177 While this may
be true, the analysis of Dean seems (with respect) to be apt when he points
out that the example given of an everyday transaction with a customer is
different from the negotiations between the parties to a serious commercial
contract.178
Even if both parties are aware of the risks inherent in contractual
negotiation because they are serious commercial negotiators, rather than
fickle shoe shoppers, perhaps they should not be free to dash legitimate
expectations where these have been created by their conduct. While a large
retailer may squeeze its suppliers through legitimate hard bargaining and the
mere promise of a potential contract induces all kinds of expenditure in an
effort to tender for the contract, if negotiations have progressed to a certain
point and are then broken off in bad faith by the retailer, perhaps it may
indeed be liable to pay damages. Of course each case would have to be
assessed on its facts and the conventional manner in which that type of
retailer does business, as well as the business acumen of its counterpart in
negotiations, will have to be assessed.
Thus it seems that the foundations on which the Murray decision is built
are completely out of date. Following the recognition of delictual actions for
negligent misstatement and misrepresentation, as well as the development of
a jurisprudence surrounding good faith (or public policy),179 it makes sense
to extend these actions to cases where no contract results. Boberg’s claim that
the correctness of this decision ‘cannot be doubted’180 seems, with respect, to
have been overtaken by the passage of time. Boberg bases his argument on
the notion that ‘all’s fair’ during pre-contractual negotiations and that the
other party has no right to rely on such representations. With respect, the rise
of consumer protection and the modern view that public policy requires
fairness in contracting mean that this statement should no longer be
supported. Admittedly this involves a shifting of the risk in contractual
relations, and the implementation thereof will have to be closely monitored
by the courts, but with a shift in emphasis towards good faith in contracting
perhaps it is time that liability in the pre-contractual phase is recognised.
Seen in this light, breaking off negotiations will be wrongful where a
legitimate expectation has been induced in one’s opposing party due to a
prior fraudulent or negligent representation. McFarlane, arguing for reliance
to be the basis of pre-contractual liability in the English context, identifies
two pre-conditions for this type of liability. These are: first, that sufficient
progress has been made in negotiations to say that an ‘agreement in principle’
176 Ibid at 138.
177 Ibid.
178 Dean op cit note 149 at 154.
179 See particularly Barkhuizen v Napier supra note 108.
180 Boberg op cit note 149 at 160.
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has been reached and secondly, party B has led party A reasonably to believe
that A’s reliance will be protected.181
The present type of delictual action would be a novel one, thus requiring
an exercise of judicial discretion to determine its wrongfulness.182 The
Supreme Court of Appeal has been explicit that caution is necessary for
extending liability for pure economic loss and this will only be done where
public or legal policy requires this.183 The shift in public policy towards
fairness and reasonableness in contracting referred to above is most clearly
demonstrated in the Constitutional Court case of Barkhuizen v Napier.184 The
best way to extend this duty of good faith into the pre-contractual sphere is to
impose delictual liability along the lines set out at the beginning of this
paragraph. While an enrichment remedy may exist as set out in part II, the
potential scope of such liability is fairly narrow, necessitating a delictual
action to recover reliance losses.
IV CONCLUSION
The view that a party may negotiate a contract with impunity, secure in the
knowledge that should no binding agreement result, he or she would be free
from any liability, is outdated. Hard bargaining may legitimately use threats of
breaking off negotiations to force a better agreement — this follows from
freedom of contract. It should be possible, however, to reach a point in
negotiations when reliance expenditure will have to be compensated should
negotiations be broken off in bad faith. Whether or not reliance damages are
available will be a question of fact and will necessitate the establishment of a
legitimate expectation on the part of the innocent party that a contract would
eventuate. Furthermore there must be fault present in conduct of the
recalcitrant party in the making of pre-contractual representations. This fault
element will be satisfied if fraud can be proved, but should also be available in
appropriate circumstances for negligence. When establishing liability based
on a negligent representation the legitimacy of the plaintiff’s expectations of a
181 McFarlane op cit note 82 at 104. McFarlane suggests that reliance can be pro-
tected in English law by reforming promissory estoppel along the lines of US and
Australian law. Thus the requirement of an ‘agreement in principle’ should not be
viewed as entailing contractual liability, but rather something less than that, since the
‘agreement’ would not be supported by consideration. Only with an adjustment of
the English rules relating to promissory estoppel could this type of ‘agreement’
become binding. In SouthAfrican law consideration is not a requirement for contrac-
tual validity, but not every representation would qualify as an ‘agreement in principle’
and whether or not even an ‘agreement in principle’ would be binding is open to
debate. Hence McFarlane’s argument could be interpreted for the South African
context (in line with the present author’s argument) as requiring that negotiations
have reached a sufficient stage that a legitimate expectation could be said to exist on
the part of the defendant.
182 Anton Fagan ‘Rethinking wrongfulness in the law of delict’ (2005) 122 SALJ 90
at 94.
183 Trustees, Two Oceans Aquarium supra note 146 para 12.
184 Supra note 106.
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contract will have to be carefully interrogated to avoid an opening of the
floodgates of litigation. This would entail an expansion of the recognised
grounds on which pure economic loss is actionable, but is a natural
progression for our law to make and is supported (at least in concept, if not in
precise doctrinal foundation) by leading foreign precedent. The reliance
interest should thus be claimable by a disappointed party to contractual
negotiations which are ultimately unsuccessful and in South Africa the most
appropriate cause of action toward this end is the law of delict.
A separate question from the recoverability of reliance based losses is the
issue of reversing enrichment. A plaintiff should definitely have a claim to
reverse an unjustified transfer, provided he or she can prove actual enrich-
ment. This will generally be different from the question as to whether
services can be compensated outside of a contractual setting. Although
English law sometimes awards a quantum meruit in these situations, this
should be seen as a solution tailored to the quirks of their own legal system,
particularly the absence of a claim in tort for negligently caused pure
economic loss. Since it is foreseeable that the South African law of delict
could be expanded to allow for a claim for pre-contractual reliance, this
presents a more plausible solution to the problem of wasted services.
In sum, liability for breaking off negotiations can exist in South African
law. The theoretical development of delictual and enrichment principles has
reached the point where a small expansion of the law into a new area is all
that is required to establish such an action.
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